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Fraud and Nondisclosure in the
Vendor.-Purchaser Relation*
By William B. Goldfarb
INTRODUCTION:, ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL PROBLEM
FEW CONCEPTS in the law of torts are more pervasive than the
concept of misrepresentation. In many relationships, in many types of
transactions, in many contexts and factual patterns-it is deemed an ac-
tionable wrong to misrepresent the facts to another. So universal is this
idea that the term "fraud" has become a common mark of opprobrium
for a person who is guilty of this wrong, for the scheme or device by
which he perpetrates it and for his conduct m implementing his guilty
design.
And yet, despite the hoariness of the fraud concept and the universality
of its application, few sub-
jects in the law are so con-
THE AUTHOR (A.B., 1950, Western Reserve, fused and uncertain, so
M.A, 1951, Columbia, ILLB., 1956, Western freighted with unanswered
Reserve) is a pracucing attorney in Cleveland, queries, so laden with -
Ohio. He was formerly Editor-zn-Chlef of the
Western Reserve Law Review. consistencies.
Despite this confusion,
certain broad propositions
emerge. One such proposition is that misrepresentation involves an ac-
tivity. Typically, that activity consists of representing affirmatively, by
means of words, that some fact' exists or does not exist. Certainly, when
one thinks of fraud and deceit, one customarily conceives of it in such
terms. But the affirmative act may be nonverbal. There flows through
our law the idea that nonverbal conduct may be the equivalent of words
and involve the same implications and legal effect. So, for example,
contracts may be express or implied-in-fact. There would appear to be
no reason why the existence or nonexistence of a fact cannot be repre-
sented by means of conduct as-much as by means of words.
The most common type of nonverbal misrepresentation takes the form
of concealment or disguise. For example, the defendant-seller covers a
* This article received first prize in the 1956 Sindell Tort Competition, awarded by
Sindell, Sindell and Bourne.
'I do not intend to discuss the important but - for my purposes - irrelevant, prob-
len of the misrepresentation of opinions or of intentions and the characterization of
the state of one's mind as a representable, or misrepresentable, fact.
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defect m his merchandise with a temporary patch, making it impossible
for the plaintiff-buyer to notice it. The courts have not hesitated to hold
that such conduct is tantamount to a verbal representation that the mer-
chandise is free of defects. 2
But instances of such misrepresentations are relatively rare. Basically,
misrepresentation is a "verbal tort," like defamation, rather than an "ac-
twe tort," like assault or false imprisonment.3 And the gravamen of the
wrong is in the character of the false words used by the defendant and
the reliance which they reasonably induce in the plaintiff, to his injury.
The question to be explored by this article is this: Under what cir-
cumstances does it constitute an actionable wrong for one to remain
silent?
Silence taken alone is the most neutral of facts or states. But silence
takes on the coloration of the surrounding circumstances, and may be
pregnant with meaning.
The courts and commentators treat actionable silence or, as it is more
often denominated, "actionable nondisclosure" as a variety of misrepre-
sentation. It is one of the implied theses of the present inquiry that it
is not logical, or even helpful, to do so. True, under some circumstances,
a failure to speak may amount to the equivalent of an actual, verbal rep-
resentation of fact. Silence is, after all, a type of conduct, or at least of
forbearance. If the representation thus implied is, in fact, false, and if
the other elements of fraud are present, the plaintiff ought to be entitled
to a remedy. But, under many circumstances, silence is merely silence.
It says nothing. The silent party may fail to deny or assert a given fact.
'In Salzman v. Maldaver, 315 Mich. 403, 24 N.W.2d 161 (1946), the seller of
sheet aluminum wrapped in bundles, placed an undamaged sheet on top of each
bundle for the purpose of concealing from the buyer the fact that the other sheets
in the bundle were corroded. Held, actionable fraud.
In Southern v. Floyd, 89 Ga. App. 602, 80 S.E.2d 490 (1954) the vendor of a
house not only failed to disclose to his purchaser that the furnace was defective but
covered the break in the boiler of the furnace with a temporary filling and thereby
prevented the plaintiff-purchaser, who exercised ordinary care, from discovering the
defect. Held, the plaintiff could recover despite the fact that the contract of sale
provided that it contained' the entire contract and that no representation except as
noted therein would be binding. This did not relieve the vendor.
Similarly, where a contract of sale of a house provided that there were no un-
derstandings except those contained therein, an action for damages was allowed,
when it appeared that the vendor's agents knew that refinishing and painting had
effectually concealed structural defects from the purchaser. Under the circumstances,
the vendor s failure to reveal the hidden and material facts constituted fraud. Her-
zog v. Capital Co. 27 Cal.2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945)
* The reason for this is not difficult to imagine. Man's intelligence is verbally-based.
Our ideas are communicated and, possibly conceived in terms of words or symbols.
Some have speculated whether "thought," in the sense in which we use the word,
would even be possible in the absence of language.
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But it may be unfair and unreasonable to label is behavior as a repre-
sentation, much less a misrepresentation. And yet, even under such circum-
stances, the silence may be tortious.
The courts' insistence on relating such nondisclosure to misrepresenta-
non seems to stem from a tradition of labeling and categorizing. It will
avail us little to fight this tendency. It is enough to be aware of it. This
awareness alone can help prevent us from falling prey to that most treach-
erous of semantic traps: the tyranny of labels.
The accepted theorem in this field may be summed up as follows:
Silence or nodisclosure does not constitute an actionable wrong, unless the
defendant is under a duty to speak and disclose. This is a distillation of
the rule as it appears in countless decisions. It purports, in many cases,
to be the ground of the decision, the ratio decuiendi. But a little reflec-
non will reveal that such a theorem can never be the ground or reason for
any decision. It is far too general. And, it begs the question. The reci-
tation of the purported "rule" naturally evokes the real question: When
is there a duty to speak and to disclose? The "rule," as stated is not a
reason, but rather a rationalization. Once the court imposes liability un-
der the facts of a particular case, a duty is found'to exist. And, conversely,
once it is decided that the defendant, for whatever true "reasons,' should
not be held liable, it is "concluded" that there was no duty.
The emptiness of the "rule" and its artificiality as a basis of decision
would be vividly demonstrated by using similarly broad and question-
begging language in defining any tort or torts in general. Thus: one is
guilty of tort because one breached his duty. The language used makes
the statement sound like a "reason." But that presupposes that it were
known, universally, and in a manner easily translatable into concrete ap-
plication, when and whether the particular duty exists. But as to this,
alas, there is no such recognized generalization or theorem.
The formula found in the decisions is that there is no duty to disclose
unless there exists a fiduciary relationship between the parties, or other
special circumstances. The first part of this "rule" has the ring of cer-
tainty and definiteness. But when one studies the cases, one comes re-
luctantly -to the conclusion that this too is a rationalization rather than
a reason. Apart from the standard or classical examples of fiduciary re-
lations, the court is apt to find such a -elatonship when they have de-
cided to hold the defendant liable. And if they are not inclined to find
liability they conclude that there was no such relationship present. Of
this, more later.
The second half of the proposition, that relating to "special circum-
stances," is, perhaps, a little more broadly stated than the language of the
decisions warrants. But their effect is at least that flexible, and the rule
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is patently formulated in such a manner as to enable it to fit the numer-
ous situations which may or may not appeal to the conscience or ethical
sense of the court.
In short the rule is not a rule. If there is a duty to disclose, then non-
disclosure is tortious. This means, that if nondisclosure is for any reason
damnable under the circumstances, there is a duty to disclose.
Where does this leave us? It leaves us in no worse a position than
we would be in many other areas of the law. It is the old dilemma which
Holmes so well summed up when he stated that the life of the law has
not been logic, but experience.4 The only logic is the logic of experience,
of history or of policy, i.e. a logic of goals and purposes rather than of
reasons and rules. Students and practitioners of the law are left, then, to
study the cases and to attempt to pierce the veil of language until the es-
sence of the case is exposed, the truth whose relevance is to the facts and
their import rather than to general propositions.
We proceed then to such an examination of the cases, in terms of a
particular legal relation, viz. that between a vendor and a purchaser.5 It
is always desirable to study a legal problem in terms of a relation. Within
the framework of rights and dutes which exist by virture of the relation,
it may be possible to draw some useful generalizations. Beyond the frame-
work, generalization is hazardous.
The vendor-purchaser relation is one of the most important and most
ubiquitous of all legal relations. It is the fundamental relation of the
business world and a fertile area for tortious misrepresentation, by word,
by act or by silence.
A word about the scope of this investigation. We are here concerned
only with the substantive question: Is there a right of action? We are
not concerned with the procedural question: What remedies are avail-
able? Sometimes the remedy will be a suit for money damages; sometimes
it will be recission. But whatever the desired remedy, the prior question
arises: Is there a right? Or, in other words, was there a wrong?
I also assume all the formal elements of fraud where they may be
prerequisite to recovery- scienter, materiality, falsity, intent to induce
"reliance" and injury. Reliance is thus emphasized because it may be
asked whether one relies on silence. In effect one may rely on appear-
ances. But this is not the same, for silence does not always create an ap-
pearance. This question was discussed above in connection with the
'HOLMES, T1-I COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
'Properly, "vendor" and "purchaser" deal in real property, "buyer" and "seller" in
personal property. Herein, I will follow the courts and not preserve the distinction.
I will generally use the terms interchangeably, avoiding, moreover, except when
quoting, the use of the term "vendee."
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problem of whether or not nondisclosure always involves a representation.
Our inquiry then condenses to two questions:
1) Does a vendor have a duty to disclose to the purchaser the facts,
extrinsic and intrinsic which affect the value of the property, constituting
the subject matter of the sale?6
2) Does the purchaser have such a duty vis-a-vis his vendor?
I shall also have occasion to examine the concept of a "fiduciary rela-
tionship" since this, as has been indicated, bears directly on our problem.
Finally, I shall attempt to delineate the true framework in which the de-
cisions are made.
THE VENDOR'S DU=Y
The common law was individualistic. A man was entitled to the
benefits derivable from his shrewdness. And while, in the business world
of the Nineteenth Century, it was not considered proper to overreach, to
lie or to use trickery in order to take advantage of a purchaser, one was
not required to tell hin all that one knew. The courts felt that they were
not the protectors of morality, but the dispensers of the rule of law. A
classic English case laid down the rule that there is no duty to disclose
facts, however morally censurable their non-disclosure may be.7
Such was the view of the early cases, and such is essentially still the
rule today. The vendor is under no duty to disclose to the purchaser facts
which materially affect the value of the property. Caveat emptor is the
touchstone today as it was in former times. Writers who believe that this
caveat has lost much of its content seem to be misreading the bulk of the
decisions.8 True there are exceptions to and qualifications on the rule.
But most of them, upon analysis, seem to resolve themselves into this:
an exceptional or peculiar fact pattern may produce a deviating result.
But the generality of the general rule suffers little thereby.
Gayne v. Smith9 involved the sale of land. The vendor was aware of
the fact that the water company had the right to condemn the property.
The purchaser would not have bought the land had she known this fact,
but she made no inquiry. And the vendor was silent. He was silent,
that is, toward the purchaser. As to others, he requested them not to men-
tion the facts to the purchaser. Held, the vendor was not liable for the
concealment. The court felt that the vendor did not actually conceal the
fact or divert or forestall an intended inquiry despite the request made
'This article is limited to such facts, and does not consider the problem of nondis-
closure by the purchaser of his insolvency. This problem is illustrated by the case of
Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1928).
'Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
'For example, Comment, 22 BOSTON UNIV. L. Rv. 607 (1942)
'104 Conn. 650, 134 Ad. 62 (1926).
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of third parties. Stress was also laid on the fact that the right of con-
demnation was a matter of record and could be ascertained. At least four
qualifications on the rule are enunciated by way of dictum. The first
may be expressed in the words of the court.
A vendor of property may not do anything to conceal from the vendee
a material fact affecting it or deliberately hide defects, for in so doing
he is not merely remaining silent, but is taking active steps to mislead. '
The court distinguishes between active concealment and mere nondis-
closure. This distinction is quite commonly drawn." Yet, it is sub-
mitted, it is somewhat artificial. There would seem to be a continuum
between the two supposed opposites, as there usually is where a sharp
dichotomy is set up. Nevertheless, the distinction has some validity, and,
if useful, should be applied. Active concealment seems to be morally
more reprehensible. Moreover, as shown earlier, active concealment seems
to amount to misrepresentation by conduct.
The second qualification is closely related to the first.
the surrounding circumstances may be such that the effect of his [the
vendor's] silence is actually to produce a false impression in the mind of the
vendee, and [to] lead the vendee to believe that a certain fact exists
and so amount to an affirmation of it.
This again refers to misrepresentation by conduct. Here the silence loses
its neutrality and, combined with "surrounding circumstances" becomes
vocal, if not verbal.
The third qualification is that the vendor may "stand in such a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence to the vendee that it is his duty to make
a full disclosure." This qualification will be discussed at length later in
the artide.
The fourth qualification is that if the plaintiff has an opportunity to
ascertain the facts he cannot complain of the nondisclosure.ia
If any of these four situations were present, the general rule would
not apply. But, unfortunately for the purchaser, none was found to be
present, and he went remediless.
"Id. at 652, 134 Ad. at 62.
1. mere silence is quite different from concealment." Stewart v. Wyoming Cat-
tle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383 (1888).
" Gayne v. Smith, 104 Conn. 650, 652, 134 Ad. 62 (1926).
'For example, in Rothermel v. Phillips, 292 Pa. 371, 141 Ad. 241 (1928) the
plaintiff bought and the defendant sold inventory of a small store. The purchaser
had an appraiser make a cursory survey, and, on the strength thereof, he bought at
$7200. He later found much of the stock unsalable. Appraisement revealed that
the inventory was worth less than $500. The plaintiff could not recover because he
had had ample opportunity to discover the defects, even though the vendor had pre-
viously been afforded better opportunities to become acquainted with the subt
matter of the sale.
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In sharp contrast to the Gayne case is the fairly recent Illinois case of
Forest Preserve Dstrct v. Christopher.14 Here the defendant leased prem-
ises to the plaintiff and failed, though he knew the facts, to reveal that
overtures had been made by the Forest Preserve District and that condem-
nation proceedings might be instituted. The terms of the lease permitted
the lessee to improve the premises and erect buildings. Soon after the
improvements were completed, condemnation proceedings were com-
menced. The lessor then sought, in equity, the condemnation award.
The lessee sought to have the court reject the application until the lessor
"does equity" and purges himself of his bad faith by paying the lessee the
reasonable value of the improvements, despite the fact that the real estate
was the lessor's and the improvements, were fixtures.
The issue was essentially the same as in the Gayne case despite the
fact that this was not a direct action founded on an alleged fraud. More-
over, the lessor-lessee relationship, particularly where there is involved,
an option to purchase, as there apparently was here, is the same, for all
practical purposes, as the vendor-purchaser relation.
The lessor argued, as did the vendor in Gayne, that the lessor "never
asked him for any information regarding the matter."
The court first acknowledged the general rule that in the absence of
a duty to speak, silence is not fraud. But then the court spoke of the
lessors "bad faith" and "unconscionable conduct" in dealing with the
lessee and declared that "it would be a serious reflection upon equity" if
the lessors prevailed in their argument that the facts alleged and proved
did not constitute fraud and deceit.
there are times and occasions when it becomes the duty of a person to
speak in order that the party he is dealing with may be placed on an equal
footing with him.
The two cases are dearly contra. The only possible distinction is that
in the Gayne case the defendant knew that condemnation Might occur
and, in the Forest Preserve case, that it would occur. The distinction is
too tenuous to be actual. In both cases the defendant knew that it was
"in the wind." But in the Forest Preserve case, the plaintiff succeeded in
pricking the conscience of the court.
In a very recent case, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in doing so, al-
though the defendant-knew that certain happenings were "in the wind."'"
Plaintiff contracted to buy a rubbish route from defendant. There were
rumors, of which defendant was aware, that the city contemplated letting
a contract to pick up combustible rubbish and thus deprive the plaintiff
"321 IMl. App. 91, 52 N.E.2d 313 (1943).
'Id. at 106, 52 N.E.2d at 319.
iJappe v. Mandt, 130 Cal. App.2d 426, 278 P.2d 940 (1955).
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of the benefit of his purchase. The court, in holding for the defendant,
used the usual cliches; arm's length dealing, no fiduciary relation, full op-
portunity for plaintiff to investigate the facts. But the real ground for
decision appears to be that what defendant failed to disclose were not
facts and merely rumors. Logically, this is unsatisfying. If defendant is
under a duty to disclose what he knows, then the fact that what he knows
is rumor and not fact should not excuse him. That there is such a rumor
in the air is, after all, a fact. The plaintiff should- if the duty exists -
be allowed to determine for himself how much credence to place in the
rumor. But, despite the lack of logic, the courts seem to be impressed by
the criterion of certainty of the "fact" alleged to be concealed, i.e. cer-
tainty in the defendant's mind. The instant case distinguished an earlier
case in the same jurisdiction,1 7 in which the defendant, who was a city
councilman, knew, by virtue of Ins position, of official action that had
already been decided upon and which would and did have the effect of
greatly depreciating the value of the subject matter of the transaction.
Another recent California case is akin to the cases just discussed.18
This was an action for fraud by purchasers of a resort against the vendors.
The alleged fraud consisted in the failure to disclose that part of the im-
provements were within the right of way of a state highway. The defen-
dant argued caveat emptor and pointed to the general rule of "no duty."
The court, with little explanation, said "this contention is untenable in
the law of fraud" and found that the vendors breached their duty to dis-
close the information. The court appeared to be blissful in its unaware-
ness of its patently question-begging approach. The very issue was
whether this was fraud, and it could not be disposed of by saying, in ef-
fect, "you cannot say this is not fraud, because the reasons you urge are
not applicable in cases of fraud."
The Gayne case is relied on and quoted in a very recent Connecticut
decision.19 The plaintiff here sued to recover the cost of correcting struc-
tural defects in a house purchased from the defendant. The latter had
mentioned to the plaintiff the depth of the footings for the house and the
location of the septic tank, in which two particulars the house did not
meet the provisions of the building code. The court, in holding for the
defendant, said that the facts presented a case of nondisclosure rather than
of deliberate concealment, and stressed that the defendant had not de-
liberately conceived the purpose of deceiving the plaintiff and of luring
hun into a false belief. This language indicates that the difference be-
tween nondisclosure and concealment may lie in the intent, or at least in
' Dyke v. Zaiser, 80 Cal. App.2d 639, 182 P.2d 344 (1947).
m Kaflgren v. Steele, 131 Cal. App.2d 43, 279 P.2d 1027 (1955).
"Egan v. Hudson Nut Products Inc., 142 Conn. 344, 114 A.2d 213 (1955).
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the maotve, of the defendant. Thus delineating the difference does not
change the fact that the formula is in reality a semantic device. But if it
achieves the goal (so often confronted in the law) of "drawing the line,"
it is not to be disparaged by calling it "semantic."
The court enunciates the general rule that "mere disclosure does
not ordinarily amount to fraud" and qualifies it by stating that it may do
so "under exceptional circumstances." Such circumstances are found if
there was "a request or an occasion or a circumstance which unposes a
duty to speak." But the court does not explain when the duty arises. It
does, however, elaborate the hint that intent is material and declares that
nondisclosure is actionable for fraud only if the defendant intends or ex-
pects to cause a mistake by another, in order to induce him to enter into
or refrain from entering into a transaction.
In a strikingly similar case involving nondisclosure of defects as to a
septic tank, it was held that the purchaser of a house could not rescind
the contract on the ground of fraud even though the sanitary engineer
had expressed to the defendant the opinion that the drainage was inade-
quate, and the latter had not disclosed this to the purchaser.2°
The idea that nondisclosure is ordinarily not actionable stems at least
in part from the old tort notion that there is a vital distinction between
misfeasance or malfeasance, on the one hand, and nonfeasance, on the
other. For the latter there was classically no liability unless there was
some definite relation between the parties which imposed a duty to speak
or act. Thus in Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co.21 the plain-
tiff was in the business of pasting linings to fabrics, using a paste or ce-
ment which it purchased from one Ellis. The latter, in turn, purchased it
from the defendant-manufacturer who knew that it would be used by the
plaintiff. The cement was negligently manufactured and mixed and in-
jured the fabrics on which it was used. Defendant knew the facts. The
plaintiff sued for negligence and for fraud. As to the fraud the court
stated the general rule (and declared it to represent the weight of author-
ity) that there is no liability for bare nondisclosure even though the facts
were known, "unless the parties stand in such relation to one another
that one is under a legal or equitable obligation to communicate the facts
to the other." In an attempt to put flesh on this skeletal principle, the
court pointed out that there were no contractual relations between the
parties. Apropos, there was no liability for negligence either. The entire
argument is reminiscent of the old privity requirement.
Other cases have also cited Gayne v. Smith, including one which in
"Dozier v. Hawthorne Development Co., 37 Tenn. App. 279, 262 S.W.2d 705
(1953).
239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921).
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turn has been much cited and quoted. 22  Here, plaintiff-purchaser sought
to have property ,impressed with a constructive trust on the theory that
it was fraudulent on the part of the defendant-vendor not to disclose that
he owned property contiguous to that which he sold to the plaintiff. Held,
no actionable fraud. By way of dictum the court stated that
Where, before the transaction is completed he [the silent party] knows
or suspects that the other is acting under a misapprehension which, if the
mistake were mutual, would cause the transaction to be voidable, he is
under a duty to disclose the facts.'
This case apparently came within the rule that a party to a contract to
sell land is under no general duty to disclose facts to the other party,
rather than the exception just quoted. Many cases are in accord.34
Countless cases deal with the nondisclosure by a vendor of realty of
defects in the property itself. The courts seem to be anything but unam-
mous in their decisions, some adhering to the harsh rule of "no duty,"
others apparently willing to make an exception in the case of severe de-
fects, especially if they are latent and not readily discoverable even by a
diligent purchaser. It is not really possible to reconcile the decisions. A
representative sampling of some of the most interesting cases follows.
I will begin with one of the most extreme cases of all.25 The defend-
ant-vendor of a dwelling house knew that the house was infested with
termites and that this fact was neither known to nor easily observable by
the purchaser. This condition, needless to say, drastically impaired the
value of the house, and necessitated substantial expenditures by the plain-
tiff. Plaintiff alleged all these facts and the further fact that he had ex-
ercised due care in inspecting the house. The defendant's demurrer was
sustained. The court laid great stress on the fact that the defendant was
silent. He made no false statements or representations. Nor did he utter
a "half truth which may be tantamount to a falsehood." Nor did he pre-
vent the plaintiff from acquiring information as to the condition of the
house. The court said that there was nothing to show any fiduciary rela-
tion between the parties or confidence and dependence on the part of the
plaintiff. " The parties made a business deal at arm's length."
The charge is cbncealment and nothing more; and it is concealment in
the simple sense of mere failure to reveal, with nothing to show any pecul-
iar duty to speak.'
" Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229, 43 A.2d 221 (1945).
I Id. at 233, 43 A.2d at 223.
"For example, Salter v. Aviation Salvage Co., 129 Miss. 217, 91 So. 340 (1922)
in which the vendor concealed from the purchaser the fact that he owned other sim-
ilar property although he knew that the purchaser was interested in that fact. Heldu,
there was no such fraud as would vitiate the contract.
"Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942).
Id. at 678, 42 N.E.2d at 808.
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The court refuses to admit, or to realize, that a duty exists if the court
finds it, that it is not a conditton to the imposition of liability but a conse-
quence thereof.
Many cases rely on the presence of "arm's length" relations. More
will be said of this later, but it may be asked at this juncture whether
this is not a judicially invented fiction. Are the parties really at arm's
length if one is m a superior position to know facts which would, if
known to the other, dissuade him from entering into the transaction?
And if one does know them, and the other does not; and if -the former is
aware of the latter's ignorance, and aware, further that the innocent party
could not by reasonable diligence discover the facts; and knowing all tis
he is silent, are they in any sense at arm's length? It may be wise not to
impose liability. But it is not wise to ground the decision on so transpar-
ent a fiction as that of an "arm's length" transaction. True, there is no
actual duress. There is no verbal deceit. And there is no active hiding
of the defect. But is that to say that the parties are at arm's length? Is
there not a hidden defect? Is there not, so to speak, a conspiracy between
the defendant and the existing circumstances; a conspiracy of silence; a
conspiracy to exploit the plaintiff's ignorance? Perhaps this is not so
censurable as to justify the imposition of liability, or even the rescission
of the contract at the instance of the victim. But the use of fictions, un-
der the circumstances, serves to becloud rather than to clarify the law.
This court finally shows its hand. The decision is -not based on prm-
ciple, but on policy. And what is that policy? The court speaks:
If tlus defendant is liable every seller is liable who fails to disclose
any nonapparent defect known to him in the subject of the sale which
materially reduces its value and which the buyer fails to discover. Sim-
ilarly it would seem that every buyer would be liable who fails to dis-
dose any nonapparent virtue known to him in the subject of the purchase
which materially enhances its value and of which the seller is ignorantY'
The old familiar bogey- a flood of litigation.
The court also, however, takes a stand on the moral question.
The law has not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing upon
the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this. That the par-
ticular case here stated by the plaintiff possesses a certain appeal to the
moral sense is scarcely to be demed."
But the clear implication is that that "appeal to the moral sense" is not so
strong as to overcome the considerations of policy. Hence, judgment for
the defendant.
'Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 678, 42 N.E.2d 808
(1942).
Old. at 678, 679, 42 N.E.2d 808; 809.
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Day v. Fredemckso"29 represents an almost equally extreme point of
view. Defendant, in selling plaintiff a house, failed to inform him of the
defective condition of the plumbing, which was so installed and connected
with a cesspool that sewer gas escaped into the house. The court held
that the vendor was under no legal obligation to disclose the facts in the
absence of a request to do so. Mere silence was not such deceit as would
constitute a cause of action for damages.
Bu; in this area, (nondisclosure of latent defects in realty) most of
the cases seem to take the opposite tack and to impose upon the vendor a
duty of disclosure, with a correlative liability in the event of a breach.
They recognize and enunciate the general rule that the vendor owes no
duty of disclosure to the purchaser and then find some exceptional cir-
cumstance to justify an exceptional result. Other cases can, however, be
found, similar to the two just considered, in which similar or even more
unusual cricumstances, did not lead to a relaxation of the rule.
Two propositions are commonly stated: (1) If the material facts are
accessible to the vendor only, and he knows that they are not known to
and are not within the reach of the diligent attention, observation and
judgment of the plaintiff, the vendor is bound to disclose them; (2)
Where the conditions affect personal health and safety the vendor's duty
is greater than where they merely affect the value of the property.
The second of these statements is particularly interesting and is found
in quite a few cases. Its interest lies in the fact that the action being
prosecuted in no way deals with personal injury such as might have re-
sulted from the defect. It always deals with the complaint that the plain-
tiff received property of less value than he expected.
In Mincy v. Crtsler"° defendant sold to plaintiff a house situated in
part over a covered ditch. The ditch was covered with decayed timber.
The defendant was held bound to disclose the facts. The plaintiff, the
court declared, had a right to assume that no prudent man would build
in that manner. It would seem, although the court did not speak in such
terms, that more than mere silence was involved. In the first place, the
defendant had created the defect, i.e. it was not natural. And, in the sec-
ond place, the covering of the ditch, although done for purposes of facili-
tating construction, and not for purposes of concealment, nevertheless
amounted to a concealment of the defect. In building in that fashion,
the defendant should be held to be representing to all prospective pur-
chasters, though none was then identified or contemplated, that there was
no such condition as a ditch. This brings the case into the category of
misrepresentation by conduct, even though the conduct was not with ref-
153 Minn. 380, 190 N.W 788 (1922).
132 Miss. 223, 96 So. 162 (1923).
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erence to the particular purchaser. The court emphasized the health and
safety factor and the inaccessibility of the facts to the plaintiff.
And in Weikel v. Sterns,31 where the owner of a lot erected a building
with such a sewage pit arrangement as to make the property very uncom-
fortable on account of the unpleasant odor, an action for damages for
fraud was held to lie. This is dearly contrary to the Day case discussed
above.
There was some evidence that the vendor acted in good faith and
without knowledge of the real condition. To this the court replied that
"he knew enough facts to put a reasonable man on notice, and when he
sold an innocent purchaser the house, causing hun a loss by reason of the
concealment of the facts, the loss should fall on him and not on the pur-
chaser."32
In Kaze v. Compton,a3 the purchasers of a house sued in deceit for
the vendor's alleged concealment of the existence of a draintile which ran
beneath the house and caused water to accumulate under the house and in
the yard. After a verdict for the plaintiff the trial court sustained the
vendor's motion for summary judgment. On appeal it was reversed on
the ground that under the state of the evidence summary judgment was
improper. The court also discussed the substantive issue in the following
terms.
If deception is accomplished, the form of the deceit is immaterial. And
the legal question is not affected by the absence of an intent to deceive, for
the element of intent, whether good or bad, is only important as it may
affect the moral character of the representation'
The court cited the Weikel case and pointed out that in the case at bar
the concealed condition was not so extreme as in that case. There it was
inherently damaging, while here it was potentially so. "But the condi-
ton was substantial or vital enough to place a duty upon the vendors to
disclose it." 5 In other words, the severity of the defect is an important
criterion of the duty of disclosure. If it is severe enough, then mere
negligence on the part of the defendant in not learning of it may be a
sufficient predicate of liability. If it is less substantial, his motive and
intent become material.
In another case the defendant owned two residential lots. He knew
that they had been filled with debris in 1928 and had been covered so
that the fact of the filling did not appear from a casual examination of
142 Ky. 513, 134 S.W 908 (1911).
'Id. at 514, 134 S.W at 909.
283 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1955).
T Id. at 207.
SKaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Ky. 1955).
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the property. The fact of filling materially increased the cost of building.
In 1940, the defendant sold the lots to the plaintiff. The latter saw the
lots and made no inquiry as to whether they were filled or not, and the
defendant made no verbal representations. After discovering the fact, the
plaintiff sought to rescind the transaction. In a very short opinion the
court held for the plaintiff. The points emphasized were the vendor's
knowledge, the purchaser's ignorance and the inaccessibility of the facts.36
Rothstem v. Janss Investment Corp.37 involved almost identical facts.
Here the court allowed the purchaser to recover damages for fraud and
deceit. The damages resulted from the fact that the fill necessitated the
use of deep and expensive foundations. The purchaser had inspected the
premises, but in view of the latent nature of the defect, this was not a
defense.
A Washington court articulated the principle under consideration by
saying that a lessor must disclose concealed defects which are known to
him and not easily discoverable.38 The court declared that normally there
is no implied covenant by a landlord that the demised premises are fit for
the purposes for which demised. Yet here, where the lessor failed to dis-
close that the basement of a building leased for an automobile agency was
subject to flooding during the rainy season and that, as a result, the heat-
ing plant was rendered useless, the fraud barred the lessor from recovering
rent after the lessee had left the premises.
Finally, Greenberg v. Glickman39 allowed the plaintiff-purchaser of
realty to recover for fraud against the vendor when the defendant failed
to disclose a sub-surface water condition which resulted in the flooding
of the basement of a residence building constructed by the defendant. The
court admitted that "the relationship of the parties was unaffected by any
fiduciary obligation" and that by the general rule "the seller was under
no duty to disclose to the plaintiff all of the circumstances affecting the
value of the subject matter of the sale." 40 But, the court said, "there may
be circumstances, where the failure to disclose facts known to the seller
and unknown to the buyer may be tantamount to concealment."41 Such
circumstances were here found to exist. The reason seems to be that
since the defendant contracted to erect a building with a finished base-
mClauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App.2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941).
m45 CaL App.2d 64. 113 P.2d 465 (1941).
'Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934).
50 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1944) modified, 268 App. Div. 882, 51 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1945),
appeal denwd, 268 App. Div. 987, 51 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1945).




ment, it "invited the impression that there were no conditions below the
surface of the land that would affect the utilization of the basement.:4 2
Thus we see that in the case of a vendor of realty most courts are in-
dined to impose on him a rather strict duty of disclosure of latent defects
in the property. On one theory or another they make an exception to the
usual rule. The most emphasized point is the difficulty or impossibility
of the purchaser's discovering the defect for himself. That is to say, the
duty of discovery is not cast upon the purchaser although he could, pre-
sumably, learn of the defect if he paid for a thorough, expert investiga-
tion. This appears to be sound, for if the defect were discovered and the
contract of purchase not consummated, (because the vendor would not
agree to a satisfactory downward adjustment in the purchase price) the
purchaser is out-of-pocket to the extent of the cost of the investigation.
The more serious the defect, the more hidden, and the more dangerous to
personal health - the more likely are the courts to find nondisclosure
tantamount to fraud. At a certain point, the vendor will be held respon-
sible even if he was, in fact, ignorant of the defect.
Some courts impose liability on the vendor, or at least allow rescission
by the purchaser, where the undisclosed fact was not a latent defect in
the property but a "defect" in the amount of property being conveyed.
So, where the purchaser, known to the defendant-vendor, believed that a
driveway and a garage were on the latter's property, the plaintiff was per-
mitted to rescind.43  On the other hand, it has been held that the mere
failure of a vendor of realty to refer the vendee to his record muniments
of title or the judicial decisions bearing upon it, is not such fraud as to
deprive him of the benefit of the rule that damages will not be awarded
against a good faith vendor who is unable to convey a good title.44
Several cases have been found in which the vendor of realty failed to
disclose to the purchaser the fact that the vendor had been making an un-
lawful use of the property. From the point of view of the purchaser's
loss traceable to the undisclosed fact, there is no difference between non-
"lThe court added, "With knowledge of the existence of subsurface water and the
likelihood of its seepage through the basement floor, the silence of the defendant
amounted to the suppression of a highly material fact"
" O'Shea v. Morris, 112 Neb. 102, 198 N.W 866 (1924).
"Crenshaw v. Williams, 191 Ky. 559, 231 S.W 45 (1921). See also Jewell v.
Allen, 188 Okla. 374, 109 P.2d 235 (1941). This was a damage action for deceit.
Plaintiff bought from defendant an undivided royalty interest in the oil rights cov-
ered by an oil and gas lease. Both of the parties were lease brokers. Defendant
failed to inform plaintiff that the lease referred to additional acreage and contained
a provision giving the owner of the royalty in the additional acreage a right to share
in the well produced on the land from which plaintiff received his royalty. Held,
the failure to so inform did not constitute fraud. The court emphasized plaintiff's
experience as a lease broker and his presumed familiarity with such transactions.
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disclosure of such a fact and of any other. It is certainly of no greater
materiality. Yet the cases seem uniformly to allow a recovery or rescis-
sion as the case may be, by the misled purchaser. One almost feels from
reading these cases that the courts are penalizing the vendor not so much
for his failure to make full disclosure, as for the unlawful manner in
which he operated his own property.
For example, in Burzillo v. Thompson4 5 the defendant-vendor of an
apartment building stated that the rent for a particular apartment was
$150 a month furnished, and failed to disclose that the ceiling rental was
$60 a month unfurnished and that his application to the Rent Admims-
trator for a ceiling rental of $150 a month was pending. Actually, the
vendor was collecting a rental of $150 a month in violation of the then
applicable law. The court held that the purchaser was entitled to rescind
the contract and recover his deposit money.
In another case, 1 the same court went into more detail in its opinion.
Here there was a representation by the vendor47 of a roominghouse that
the rentals were $297 a month. And so they were. But they were in ex-
cess of the ceiling rental. The trial court held that the plaintiff did not
make out a prima facie case. The appellate court reversed and held that
the purchaser had a cause of action in fraud for damages. The court said
that the plaintiff was entitled to believe that the rentals being collected
were lawful (Query).
Defendant had no right to withhold from plaintiffs the highly ma-
terial and important information that the $297 rental had not been law-
fully approved. Though he was telling the literal truth, he was really
telling only a half-truth."
The court then analogized the situation to one where the vendor reveals
some defect in the property and conceals or remains silent as to other
defects, latent in their nature, and concluded "there can be no doubt that
in this case there was misrepresentation by suppression."
The reader may well inquire why the plaintiff is not barred by his
failure to ascertain the facts. Surely they were a matter of public record.
The court rejected this argument, saying that the plaintiffs rightfully re-
lied on the defendant's statement and were justified in assuming that their
vendor had not violated the Rent Act. "In these circumstances, the rule
of caveat emptor does not apply."49 The court gives no reason in sup-
port of this statement, but merely cites and quotes a case 50 in which there
' 57 A.2d 195 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1948).
'Tucker v. Beazley, 57 A.2d 191 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1948).
'
TThe case actually involved a lease with option to purchase.
MId. at 193.
"Tucker v. Beazley, 57 A.2d 191, 194 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1948).
'Lester v. Superior Motor Car Inc., 117 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
[December
FRAUD AND NONDISCLOSURE
was (1) an actual misrepresentation and (2) information peculiarly in
the vendor's knowledge.
There was, as might be anticipated, a vigorous dissent. Among other
things the dissent argues that the plaintiff had more duty to inquzpe about
rent ceilings than the defendant to speak.
While the doctrine of caveat emptor may be less regorously enforced
today than formerly the law still requires a purchaser to use reasonable
care for his own protection.'
Both of these rent ceiling cases might be explained by the fact that
there was more than silence, i.e. there was a representation which, while
literally true, conveyed, under the circumstances, a false impression. But
it is believed that a more likely explanation is that already suggested, vz
the desire to penalize a reprehensible defendant.
This motive is even more clearly illustrated in the interesting case of
Ikeda v. Curtts.52 Here, plaintiffs bought a hotel from defendant. De-
fendant stated that there was a certain amount of income and that it came
from permanent and transient guests. The income was even greater than
represented, and the source was as stated. But, to the plaintiff's embar-
rassment and chagrin, the principal source of income was from the use
of the premises for purposes of prostitution. The court held that the
plaintiffs felt, and "naturally" so "that they were buying a legitimate busi-
ness." Plaintiffs recovered damages for the fraud. No explanation is
discernible for the imposition of the duty other than the nature of the
vendor's occupation.
In another case, a contract for the sale of land was held unenforceable
for reasons of public policy because the vendor did not disclose that his
profit was inordinate and unfair.53
But not all the instances of undisclosed illegality produce the same re-
sult. In Watt v. Patterson5 4 the defendant sold her roominghouse to the
plaintiff. Actually the property was in a single-residence zone. The
court held that the mere fact that defendant had been operating a room-
inghouse did not constitute an actionable misrepresentation that the house
was legally available as such. The key point was that the defendant was
unaware of the restriction. The reasoning suggested above seems to ap-
ply. Here the defendant's conduct was-because of his ignorance- less
censurable. The court also discussed the fact that at most the representa-
tion was one of an opinion or one of law.
n See note 49 supra.
-43 Wash.2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953).
=I-agge v. Drew, 157 P.2d 408 (Cal. App. 1945). The land was to be used to
build homes for war workers, and the transaction was under the Federal Housing Act.
- 125 Cal. App.2d 788, 271 P.2d 200 (1954).
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In cases of the sale of chattels the problem of nondisclosure may be
intimately bound up with the problem of warranty. Frequently the law
implies certain warranties, and a failure to disclose the existence or non-
existence of a fact, may create a dual cause of action: (1) breach of war-
ranty and (2) misrepresentation. So far as can be determined, no par-
ticular practical significance attaches to this dualism.
The cases indicate, for example, that the buyer of an automobile from
a dealer or manufacturer may, in the absence of an understanding or
knowledge to the contrary, assume that it is new.5 5  In an early case,56
the defendant-dealer sold and the plaintiff bought a mowing machine
under a written contract containing an express warranty that the machine
was "good and well made" and would "do as good work as any other ma-
chine in its class." The terms of the warranty were literally complied
with, but the machine was second-hand. The purchaser was allowed to
recover. Newness of the machine was implied. Strictly speaking, the
case was not decided on a theory of misrepresentation. But, analysis in-
dicates that it is the silence of the vendor which was held blameworthy.
In Donovan v. Aeolian Co.57 the plaintiff purchased a piano, believing
it to be new. It was, in fact, used and reconditioned. In New York, at
leas't as of the date of that case, there was no warranty of newness implied
in law. And the court stated broadly that if the seller does not know that
the buyer is acting under the belief that the artide is new and has done
nothing to induce the belief, the buyer cannot complain. Silence is not
actionable so long as it is "consistent with honest dealing" and "does not
constitute deception." Here, the plaintiff recovered, the jury having
found that defendant's salesman knew that the plaintiff thought the piano
was new.
Statutes in some jurisdictions provide that an implied warranty or con-
dition as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed
by the usage of the trade.58
Other cases, with or without the application of statutes, reach similar
results in the case of the sale of animals and of meat.59
'Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940).
eGrieb v. Cole, 60 Mich. 397, 27 N.W 579 (1886)
270 N.Y. 267, 200 N.E. 815 (1936).
'Under such a statute, Fox v. Boldt, 172 Wis. 333, 179 N.W 1 (1920) held that
where defendant purchased a tractor from plaintiff, there was an implied warranty
that the machine delivered would be new. Therefore, on delivery of a secondhand
machine, the defendant was entitled to offset his damages from the breach of such
warranty against the balance due on the purchase price. The court took judicial
notice of the trade usage which comported with the assumption of newness.
'Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (1918) (NEW YORK PER-
SONAL PROPERTY LAW, §96, as added by Laws 1911, c. 571). But see Barton v.
Dowis, 315 Mo. 226, 230, 285 S.W 988, 989 (1926) The latter declares: "In the
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There remains to be considered one group of cases, those dealing with
the sale of corporate securities.
Lovell v. Smith 0 was an action by a subscriber for the stock of a
corporation of which the defendants were the promoters and directors.
The defendants had not disclosed, in the prospectus used in solicinA
stock subscriptions, that they had secured their stock on more advan-
tageous terms than those on which it was being offered to the public and
to the plaintiffs, and that they (the defendants) had procured, at the out-
set, voting control over the company. Had these facts been disclosed,
plaintiff would not have subscribed for the stock. The trial court found
that no statements in the prospectus were fraudulent or calculated to de-
ceive the plaintiff. On appeal, the judgment for the defendant was af-
firmed. The court held that no duty of disclosure existed, because no
fiduciary relation existed.
On the other hand, in Stern v. Natond City Co.61 the plaintiff, who
purchased securities from the defendant, successfully maintained that the
sale inpiedly represented that the securities were properly registered un-
der the applicable Blue Sky laws.6 2  The court said:
The rule of caveat emptor has been modified, and the sale itself may
give rise to implied representation 'just as effectively as though the seller
had made express statements to the same effect.!
The distinction between these two cases would seem to lie in the na-
ture of the undisclosed fact. In the latter it was one which the sale im-
plied; in the former it is doubtful whether that is so. But, the true dif-
ference, it is submitted, is in the attitude toward the relation subsisting
between plaintiff and defendant. If the relation were fiduciary, both facts
would be reasonably implied, if it were not, neither would. More will be
said later about the nature of a fiduciary relation.64
sale of animals, the rule of caveat emptor applies and there is no implied warranty
that the animals are free from disease. That, of course, applies where the seller is
ignorant of any disease with which the animal may be affected and where both the
seller and the buyer are equally informed and have equal opportunities for inspec-
tion of the animal. If the seller knows, or has reason to know, the animal he sells
is afflicted with a disease not known to the purchaser and not discernible on inspec-
tion, he is guilty of fraud." The quoted statement is, however, dictum since it was
found that the seller was innocent, and a judgment for the plaintiff-buyer was re-
versed.
' 232 Ala. 626, 169 So. 280 (1936).
6125 F. Supp. 948 (D. Minn. 1938), af'd, 110 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1940), rev'd on
a procedural pomnt, 312 U.S. 666 (1940).
a The statute of limitations was involved, and, in order to avoid being barred thereby,
plaintiff had to show that his action sounded in fraud.
'
1Stern v. Nauonal City Co., 25 F. Supp. 948, 956 (D. Minn. 1938).
" See Playland Park Stadium Corp. v. J. H. Spector and Sons, 253 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952). This was an action-against a corporation and individuals for
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SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Aside from the broad exception for misrepresentation by conduct, cer-
tain other fact patterns deviate from the general rule of "no duty." These
apply as well to the purchaser's liability as to the vendor's, but it seems
convenient to outline them at this point.
If there is, in addition to silence, any statement which tends affirma-
tively to a suppression of the truth, or to the withdrawal or distraction of
the other party's attention from the real facts, the concealment becomes
traudulent.5
If the purchaser makes inquiries, and the vendor answers evasively,
and in such a manner as to mislead, he is liable even though there was
no affirmative misrepresentation. 6
Suppose the vendor has previously made a true statement as to the
condition of the property, and, before the transaction is consummated, the
conditions change. Although there are some cases to the contrary, the
better view would seem to be that under such circumstances, the vendor
has a duty to disclose the change.67 Sometimes the court attempts to
analyze the earlier statement and to deterune whether it was a continu-
ing representation or one which related only to the then existing state
of affairs.68 If it was the latter, there is no liability for the subsequent
silence. The distinction seems tenuous.
One of the principal exceptions remains to be commented upon.
While silence alone may not be actionable, if the vendor undertakes to
speak, he must not conceal anything which would tend to qualify or con-
tradict the facts which he had stated. In other words, to tell half of the
truth is to make a half-false representation. For example, Coral Gables,
Inc. v. Mayer69 was an action on some promissory notes brought by the
successor to the payee corporation against the maker. The notes had
been given in payment for property bought by the maker from the payee.
The defendant counterclaumed on, among other grounds, the ground of
fraud in the sale of the property. The corporation's agent had described
the attractive features of the property's location and told the truth, as far
resassion and for damages incurred in the purchase of debentures issued by the de-
fendant corporation. The defendants failed to disclose the exact nature of the own-
ership of property which affected the security for the notes. The court, without dis-
cussion, found a duty of disclosure and held the defendant liable for fraud.
'Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co. v. White, 361 Mo. 1111, 238 S.W.2d
368 (1951).
Southern v. Floyd, 89 Ga. App. 602, 80 S.E.2d 490 (1954).
'Childress v. Nordman, 238 N.C. 708, 78 S.E.2d 757 (1953).
8 Ibsd.
e'241 App. Div. 340, 271 N.Y. Supp. 662 (1934), a!'d, 246 App. Div. 518, 282
N.Y. Supp. 596 (1935), afi'd, 270 N.Y. 670, 1 N.E.2d 991 (1936).
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as he went. But he omitted to advise the purchaser of the proximity of
"obnoxious business developments" which would have an adverse effect
on real estate values. The trial court excluded the issue of fraud from
the jury's consideration. Judgment for the plaintiff (the vendor's suc-
cessor) was reversed, and the courts held that it was a question for the
jury whether nondisclosure of these facts amounted to fraud. The jury
should have been charged as follows:
Every word you say may be true; but if you leave out something which
absolutely qualified it, you may make it a false statemen.'
This proposition is both sensible and salutary. But if too broadly or
literally applied it would destroy the rule which relieves the vendor of
the duty of disclosure. The courts speak of "mere silence." Yet a busi-
ness transaction is never entirely without conversation, and verbal ex-
changes nearly always involve, expressly or by implication, representations
of fact. The vendor may be silent as to some features or topics, while he
is articulate as to others. Does this deprive him of the privilege of non-
disclosure? This would dearly result if the "half-truth" principle were
loosely applied. But it is not so applied. In fact, it is reserved for those
cases in which so much is said that there is an implied representation that
there is no qualifying fact which remains unreported. That is to say,
liability will be imposed where the undisclosed fact would place an abso-
lute qualification on the disclosed facts. It is almost a case of misrepre-
sentation by conduct, the conduct consisting of the act of saying so much
that it implies that nothing material remained unsaid. An analogy may
be drawn to the general principle of tort law that where a defendant has
no duty to act, if he undertakes or assumes to act, and should foresee risks
to the plaintiff, he must carry out his undertaking with reasonable care.
Pomeroy has stated the general rule as follows:
Ordinarily, no duty of disclosure exists except (1) where there is a
previous confidential relation between the parties; (2) where it appears
one or each of the parties expressly reposes a trust or confidence in the
other; (3) or where the contract or transaction is intrinsically fiduciary
and calls for good faith, as in cases of insurance contracts the rule of
caveat emptor generally applies to sales of land.
In ordinary contracts of sales, where no previous fiduciary relation
exists, and where no confidence express or implied growing out of or con-
nected with the very transaction itself, is reposed on vendor, and the parties
are dealing with each other at arm's length, and the purchaser is presumed
to have as many reasonable opportunities for ascertaining all the facts as
any other person in his place would have had, then the general doctrine
already stated applies; no duty to disclose is not a fraudulent concealment."
This is assuredly the rule as it affects silence on the part of vendors.
" Id. at 342, 271 N.Y. Supp. at 664.
n 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 904 (5th ed. 1941).
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Yet, as we have seen, the courts, in a wide variety of situations, reach re-
sults which are not consistent with the rule. This is not to deny the au-
thority of Pomeroy or to deny the validity of the rule. It is only to point
up the famous maxim that general rules do not solve particular cases. In
short, one might say that the vendor hardly ever has a duty to disclose
facts affecting the value of his property. But there are numerous excep-
tions in addition to those which Pomeroy has indicated.
THE PURCHASER'S DUTY
In summarizing (admittedly in an over-simplified manner) the duty
of the vendor to disclose material facts to his purchaser, I concluded that
he "hardly ever" is under such a duty. When we turn to the other side
of the vendor-purchaser relation and inquire as to the duty of the pur-
chaser to make such disclosures we find he is "almost never" under an
obligation to do so. The distinction between "hardly ever" and "almost
never" is a real one. Only in relatively few circumstances does the law
impose a duty of disclosure on the purchaser. Pomeroy, in discussing the
vendor's duty, declares that
it has never been contended, in our system of jurisprudence, that a ven-
dor in a contract of sale is bound to disclose all facts which, if known by
the buyer, would prevent or tend to prevent him from making the pur-
chase.7
But when he comes to the subject of present inquiry he says
Much less has it ever been maintained that the buyer is bound to dis-
cover all facts known to himself which would enhance the value of the
article sold or affect the conduct of the vendor. (emphasis supplied)
The general rule is stated quite directly in James v. Anderson.74
One who is a prospective land buyer owes no duty in his dealings with
the owner to disclose any possible events or present or future conditions
that may greatly enhance the value of the land.'
In Grenlac Holding Corp. v. Kahn76 the plaintiff-purchaser of realty
sought specific performance of the contract. The vendor counterclaimed
for fraud and deceit alleging that the purchaser had knowledge of the
pendency of rezoning proceedings which would make the realty more
valuable. Held, summary judgment for plaintiff; he owed no duty to his
vendor to disclose his motive in purchasing the property. The court ad-
7 i POMEROY, op. ct. supra note 71, at § 901.
78 Ihuid.
", 149 Va. 113, 140 S.E. 264 (1927)
7 Id. at 122, 140 S.E. at 264.
7' 106 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1951).
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ded the usual statement that there was no fiduciary relationship and that
the parties were dealing at arm's length.
The point was also made that the pendency of the rezomng applica.
tion was a matter of public record and ascertainable by the vendor on in-
vestigation. There is a veiled implication that had the facts been pe-
culiarly in the purchaser's possession the result might have been different.
Such implications are the weakest and least reliable of dicta. The court
ridiculed the vendor's "lack of diligence" and praised the purchaser's
"business sagacity." The latter was justified in using that ability for his
"monetary advantage."
The cases thus far introduced have not discussed the logic or policy of
the rule. Two much earlier cases, one English and one American, do so.
Fox v. Mackreth77 poses a hypothetical case in which the purchaser knew
of some secret intrinsic value of the vendor's property such as, for exam-
ple, a mine. The vendor is ignorant of the facts, and the purchase price
does not take them into consideration. The purchaser does not disclose
the facts. The English court said that under the circumstances, a court of
equity cannot set aside the bargain. The reason given is not that the one
party is unaware of the unreasonable advantage taken by the other of his
knowledge, but that there is no contract between them which requires
such a disclosure.
if it were otherwise, such a principle must extend to every case in
which the buyer of an estate happened to have a dearer discernment of
its real value than the seller. It is therefore, not only necessary that great
advantage should be taken in such a contract and that such an advantage
should arise from a superiority of skill or information, but it is also neces-
sary to show some obligation binding the party to make such a disclosure.'
Trigg v. Read" contains a similar discussion. Again it is contended
that the purchaser need not disclose the facts. The vendor "is supposed
to know the value and qualities of his own property. ,,so The pur-
chaser may reap the profit of his superior skill or diligence. The cases
supporting this proposition are legion.
Some cases seem to be aware of the ethical question involved, but they
dispose of it quickly. In one case, for example, it was alleged that the
agent of the purchaser withheld from the grantor information to the ef-
fect that the property was rapidly increasing in value by reason of im-
'"2 Cox, Ch. 320, 30 Eng. Rep. 148 (1788).
"Id. at 321, 30 Eng. Rep. at 149.
'24 Tenn. 529, 42 Am. Dec. 447 (1845).
'See Annor. 56 A.L.R. 429 et seq. (1928). The annotator states that "if the ven-
dor is so indiscreet as to place reliance upon the statement of a prospective purchaser,
without finding out the truth for himself, he should be left to make the best of a
bad bargain."
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provements in a nearby city. The court asserted that "whatever moral or
ethical duty there may have rested on [the purchaser] to furnish com-
plainant [vendor] such information" there was no legal obligation.81
Hays v. Meyers82 goes still further in its emphasis on the right of a
purchaser not to disclose the knowledge he has acquired. Not only is no
legal duty found to exist, but the non-disdosure is condoned, possibly
praised, on moral grounds.
A person may with perfect honesty and propriety use for his own ad-
vantage the superior knowledge of property he desires to purchase, that has
been acquired by skill, energy, vigilance and other legitimate means [and
is under no obligation to disclose it.]' (emphasis supplied)
The same court formulates the most impressive policy argument found in
the cases to justify the rule.
If any other rule were adopted, it would have a depressing tendency on
trade and commerce by removing the incentive to speculation and profit
that lies at the foundation of almost every business venture.
A radical change in the law in this area would work havoc to the profit
system.
In Holly Hill Lumber Co. V. McCoy 8 5 the purchaser sought specific
performance of a land contract. The vendor's defense was the fraudulent
failure of the purchaser to reveal the existence of a valuable lime deposit
on the land. In an extremely well-reasoned opinion, the court enunciates
the general doctrine, quotes Pomeroy, analyzes the circumstances in which
a duty of disclosure will be found to exist and seeks to apply these broad
principles to the vendor-purchaser relation. But the cogency of the gen-
eralized reasoning is dissipated by the final statement; "Of course, each
case must depend upon its own circumstances."88 In the instant case the
presidents of both plaintiff and defendant corporations were "business
men of experience and capacity" and had had previous dealings with each
other. These circumstances were sufficient, or so concluded the court, to
make the transaction one at arm's length. Hence, there was no duty of
disclosure. As a post script the court added that the evidence showed no
"guilty knowledge," or "bad faith" on the part of the purchaser, as if to
imply that motive or intent might be a factor of decisive weight. And
so it might, in a proper case.
'Pratt Land & Improvement Co. v. McClain, 135 Ala. 452, 33 So. 185 (1902).
See also Terrell v. Marion County, 250 Ala. 235, 34 So.2d 160 (1948).
82 139 Ky. 440, 107 S.W 287 (1908).
'sId. at 442, 443, 107 S.W at 288.
Hays v. Meyers, 139 Ky. 440, 443, 107 S.W 287, 288 (1908).
5201 S.C. 427, 23 S.E.2d 372 (1942)
"Id. at 438, 23 S.E.2d at 377
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Some cases reach the same result even where the purchaser. actively
represented that the land had less value than it actually had. Such was
the case, for example, when the purchaser represented that certain realty
was valuable only for timber and, in fact, it contained iron, a fact known
to both parties, but the true value of which was known only to the pur-
chaser 3 7
In discussing the vendor's duty of disclosure, I pointed out that while
silence alone might not be actionable, any conduct or circumstances which
adds significance to the silence might be a sufficient basis on which to
ground a cause of action. The same is true in the case of the purchaser.
Not only a single word but "a nod or a wink or a shake of the head,
or a smile from the purchaser might defeat the application of the principle
that mere reticence on the part of the purchaser does not in law amount to
fraud."'
Moreover, mere silence will be enough if the court is willing to "find"
a duty of disclosure. Before it will do so, it will require a fiduciary or
quasi-fiduciary relation. The. nature of this relation will be discussed in
the next section.
There are some cases, though they represent a minority, which impose
liability on the purchaser for a mere nondisclosure, without requiring, as
a predicate, the existence of a fiduciary relation. Most of these cases in-
volve unusual circumstances of such a nature that to hold otherwise would
work an egregious injustice. Yet, it cannot be denied that they are, in
tenor at least, asserting a different attitude toward the underlying sub-
stantive problem.
Perhaps the leading American case which gives a measure of recogni-
tion to the existence of a duty is Laidlaw v. Organ,s" decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1816. The purchaser, under a contract
for the sale of tobacco, having advance information of the Treaty of Ghent
which enhanced the value of the facts, repossessed the tobacco. In this
action, the buyer sought to retake it and to get damages. The issue was
whether the purchaser was under a duty to communicate to the vendor
"the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances which might influence the
price" and which was exclusively in his knowledge. The Supreme Court
held that he was not bound to commumcate it but reversed a judgment
for the -plaintiff-purchaser because the verdict had been directed. The
question whether any imposition had been practiced by the purchaser was
properly for the jury. The court would not, at that tune, decide the ques-
tion as a matter of law.
'Williams v. Spurr, 24 Mich. 335 (1872).
' Chandler v. Butler, 284 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)
115 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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The most interesting aspect of the reported case is the argument of
opposing counsel It will be useful to quote the central section of each.
Counsel for the plaintiff-purchaser argued:
on principle, he was not bound to disclose. Even admitting that his
conduct was unlawful, in foro conscintia' does not prove that it was so in
the civil forum. Human laws are imperfect in this respect, and the sphere
of mortality is more extensive than the limits of civil jurisdiction. The
maxim of caveat emptor could never have crept into the law if the province
of ethics had been co-extensive with it. There was, in the present case, no
circumstance or manoeuvre practiced by the vendee, unless rising earlier in
the morning and obtaining by superior diligence and alertness that intelli-
gence by which the price of commodities was regulated, be such. It is a
romantic equality that is contended for on the other side. People never
can be precisely equal in knowledge, either of facts or of the inferences
from such facts, and both must concur in order to satisfy the rule contended
for. The absence of all authority in England and the United States - both
great commercial countries - speaks volumes against the reasonableness
and practicality of such a rule.'
To this, counsel for the defendant-vendor replied:
Though the record may not show that anything tending to mislead
by positive assertion was said by the vendee yet it is a case of manoeu-
vre, of mental reservation, of circumvention. The information was mo-
nopolized by the messengers from the British Fleet, and not imparted to
the public at large until it was too late for the vendor to save himself. The
rule of law and of ethics is the same. It is not a romantic, but a practical
and legal rule of equality and good faith that is proposed to be appliedY'
These arguments project what is, at least for this writer, the nub of
the problem: What should be the generative or causal relation between
the dictates of ethics and the rule of law? I shall return to this question
and attempt to define it more precisely in the last part of this article.
Delorac v. Cotna 2 illustrates the type of situation in which courts
might be inclined to impose a duty. The owner of Nebraska land resided
in California. He was not in a position to know his own land, and he
therefore had a right to rely on the purchaser's honesty. The decision is
weakened by the fact that the purchaser was not silent, but made positive
and false statements as to the value of the land. In another case the ven-
dor of a farm, who had never seen it, could secure its reconveyance where
the purchaser concealed his knowledge that it contained a gramte quarry.9 3
"Id. at 193, 194.
XLaidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 194 (1817),
'a29 Neb. 791, 46 N.W 255 (1890).
'Crompton v. Beedle, 83 Vt. 287, 75 Ail. 331 (1910). Stackpole v. Hancock, 40
Fla. 362, 378, 24 So. 914, 918 (1898) after stating the general rule, asserts that if
the purchaser "undertakes [to disclose facts or answer inquiries] he must disclose
the whole truth, without concealment of material facts, and without doing anything
calculated to prevent an investigation on the part of the vendor, especially if he does
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More interesting is a case9 4 in which the plaintiff-purchaser sued for
the delivery of rice under a contract, the rice having been sold by de-
scription and sample. The vendor's agent had made an error and was
selling a high-grade, expensive rice for a cheaper one. The court held
that as long as the plaintiff was unaware of the error, he was entitled to
the rice, for, the parties dealt on an equal footing, neither knowing the
facts. But as soon as the plaintiff learned of the error, he could neither
recover damages under the contract nor insist on delivery, "for, having
knowledge of the mistake under which the defendant was laboring, it
would be a fraud on his part to take advantage of it."95 The case is an
example of a rare species. The more orthodox dissent argued that the
plaintiff had acted honorably and was entitled to the benefit of Ins con-
tract. Other cases in point are discussed in the notes. 6
Thus, it is seen, only in rare situations does the law cast upon a pur-
chaser the duty to impart his special knowledge to his vendor. He is
generally not penalized for his nondisclosure, and, on the contrary, is per-
mitted to derive a benefit from his shrewdness, his perception and his
diligence.
not resude near the land, and the vendee does." (emphasis supplied) And the
court added that "a very little is sufficient to effect the application of this principle,
and statements ordinarily regarded as an expression of an opinion may be consid-
ered as sufficient when calculated to mislead and prevent an examination of the
property on the part of the vendor."
"Davis v. Reisinger, 120 App. Div. 766, 105 N.Y. Supp. 603 (1907)
' Id. at 769, 105 N.Y. Supp. at 604.
W In Conlan v. Sullivan, 110 Cal. 624, 42 Pac. 1081 (1895) the purchaser knew, but
failed to communicate the fact, that his vendor was laboring under a mistake as to
the existence of a mortgage on the property. Held, the vendor could rescind the sale,
where the purchaser's intent was to defraud the vendor out of the amount of the
supposed mortgage.
In Noved Realty Co. v. A. A. P. Co., 250 App. Div. 1, 293 N.Y. Supp 336
(1937) the defendant corporation obtained a $3000 deduction in the price for which
it purchased a second mortgage by representing that the existence of a record and
unpaid conditional sales contract covering property on the premises would require
the expenditure of at least $3000. The defendant did not disclose that the condi-
tonal sales contract had been secured by the deposit in escrow of $5500 (its face)
in a transaction in which the defendant had bought participation in the first mort-
gage. Said the court: " there are limits beyond which parties in that relation
(vendor-purchaser) may not go in the concealment of material facts. We think
that limit was reached and passed." Held, the corporation is liable to the seller of
the second mortgage.
And where a representative of the purchaser of standing timber obtained a thia
party to conduct a cruise of the timber both for himself and for the vendor, to deter-
mine the amount of timber on the vendor's land, the purchaser's representative was
held to be acting not only for himself but as agent of the vendor and therefore owed
the latter a positive duty of full disclosure regarding the results of the cruise. Dahl
v. Crain, 193 Ore. 207, 237 P.2d 939 (1951).
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THE PROBLEM OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATION: THE ETHICAL
QUESTION
Both in the case of the vendor and of the purchaser, the courts in-
variably declare that there would be a duty to disclose all material facts-
and a correlative liability for nondisclosure - if the parties occupied a
fiduciary relation toward each other.9 7  As a matter of fact, quite aside
from the vendor-purchaser relation, the general rule relating to the duty
to disclose is stated in similar terms, viz, there is no liability for nondis-
closure unless there was a duty of disclosure, and there is no duty of dis-
closure in the absence of a fiduciary relation. It becomes, therefore, high-
ly relevant to inquire as to what is meant by a fiduciary relation, since
liability may turn on its presence or absence. As stated in one case,98
"Where the parties are in a confidential relationship fraud is more readily
found."
Certain relationships may be called fiduciary-in-law. They are the
classical relationships of trust and confidence.9 9 They include, among
others, attorney and client,10 0 officers of a corporation and sharehold-
ers, 10 ' joint purchasers,10 2 joint owners selling the jointly-owned prop-
erty,'0 3 partner and copartner,10 4 persons under a contract to marry,'05
physician and patient,10 priest and parishioner,107 principal and agent,'08
trustee and cestui que trust,10 9 and siblings.110 These relations are pre-
sumed to be fiduciary, and between those who occupy them there is a
' "It is the duty of persons holding confidential relations, of whatever nature, with
others, to put themselves on terms of perfect equality, by furnishing full, exact and
truthful information of all matters which enter into a negotiation between them."
Columbus Co. v. Hurford, 1 Neb. 146 (1871).
'Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Minn. 96, 285 N.W 809 (1939) See also:
Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937); Daily v. Super-
ior Ct., 4 Cal. App.2d 127, 40 P.2d 936 (1935); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass.
358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Hockenberry v. Cooper County State Bank, 338 Mo. 31,
88 S.W.2d 1031 (1935).
'See 37 C.J.S. Fraud 5 16 (1943).
1
' Gidney v. Chapple, 26 Okla. 737, 110 Pac. 1099 (1910)
'Davis Bluff Land & Timber Co. v. Cooper, 223 Ala. 137, 134 So. 639 (1931)
'Walker v. Pike County Land Co., 139 Fed. 609 (8th Cir. 1905)
'Upton v. Weisling, 8 Ariz. 298, 71 Pac. 917 (1903)
' Goldsmith v. Koopman, 152 Fed. 173 (2d Cir. 1907).
s Costello v. Costello, 279 N.Y. Supp. 303, 155 Misc. 28 (1934).
'
06Colvin v. Warren, 44 Ga. App. 825, 163 S.E. 268 (1932)
'
0tFinegan v. Theisen, 92 Mich. 173, 52 N.W 619 (1892).
'aHayter v. Hudgens, 236 S.W 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
lnWhitesides v. Taylor, 105 IIl. 496 (1882).
'
0Dolan v. Cummings 116 App. Div. 787, 102 N. Y. Supp. 91 (1907), aff'd, 193
N.Y. 638, 86 N.E. 1123 (1908)
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duty to make full and fair disclosure. This is not, however, to say that
the courts and the authorities are unanimous as to the relationships to be
included in this category. Nor does it mean that a relationship which is
normally fiduciary need be so under the facts of a particular case. As a
matter of fact, there is disagreement as to some relationships and, as to
others, they may or may not be fiduciary, depending on the circumstances.
The partnership relation is normally deemed to be one of trust and
confidence. But in one case,' a partner sued ins copartner for fraud,
alleging that the defendant induced him to sell to the other his oil leases
by failing to disclose their true value. The evidence showed that the
partnership relation here was strained and abnormal. Because of the
strained relations they did not, said the court, enter the contract of sale
"with the same confidential relations existing between them as that fixed
by law."' "2  Judgment for the victim of the alleged fraud was reversed.
The court declared that "if the confidential relation fixed by law between
the parties be shown . to have been shattered," neither party has a
right to rely on the relation or "to close ins eyes to the fact that he had
ceased to repose that confidence in his associate [that] the law pre-
sumes to exist."113 Therefore, there was no right-to rely on a full dis-
closure of all the material facts.
Some courts have described the fiduciary relation in broader terms
than those expressed by the typical list of such relations. For example:
In law, a person occupies a fiduciary relation to another when he has
knowledge and authority which he is bound to exercise for the benefit of
such other person. 1'
Such a statement is undeniably true. But it is so broad as to be meaning-
less. It possesses the circularity of all question-begging' definitions, for if
it be asked when one -is bound to exercise his knowledge for the benefit
of another, the reply would doubtless be given: "When he occupies a
fiduciary relation."
A more useful definition is that in a recent Arkansas case." 5
The duty of disclosure also arises where one person is in (a) position
to have and to exercise influence over another who reposes confidence in
him whether a fiduciary relauonship in the strict sense of the term exists
between them or not.
The implication of this pronouncement is that the plaintiff may recover
"Peckham v. Johnson, 98 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), aff'd, 132 Tex. 148,
120 S.W.2d 786 (1938).
'Peckham v. Johnson, 98 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
"2 Id.
'Whitsel v. Hoover, 120 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
"'Hanson Motor Co. v. Young, 223 Ark. 191, 196, 265 S.W.2d 501, 504 (1954).
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for nondisdosure if he can show (a) that the defendant was in an in-
fluential position and (b) that the plaintiff relied. As has been shown
and as will be seen further in the sequel, the courts are not nearly so
liberal in imposing a duty of disdosure as this formula would indicate.
One more requisite exists, viz. the plaintiff must have a right to rely. He
cannot create the right for himself by the voluntary act of blind reliance.
He must be in such a position vis-a-vis the defendant, in the light of ex-
isting circumstances, that the law recognizes his right to rely.11 6 By lay-
ing down this requisite, we reascend the logical "carousel" by reasking
the basic question.
Some courts are cogmzant of this problem of definition. One, for ex-
ample, asserted that "the law is as cautious in defining a fiduciary relation
in the sense which we are now using that term as it is in limiting by
definition the boundaries within which fraud may be pursued.' 17
It is quite firmly established that the concept of a fiduciary relation is
not limited to any arbitrary class of relations.
but there are other relations not falling in [any] of those specified
classes that are in fact fiduciary. It is in each case a question of fact.
The law regards the real, rather than the nominal condition'
In short, in addition to the fiduciary relation "in law," there may be one
"in fact."' 19  "The question is always whether or not trust is re-
posed."'12 0  And "In any case where confidence is known, or may rea-
sonably be expected, to exist as a fact, whether it is of a legal, moral,
social, domestic or personal character, equity will scrutinize the transac-
tion critically to see that no inequitable action has been taken and no
injustice has occurred.'1'
Lest I create the impression that mere confidence is enough, I hasten
to add that "there must be something more than mere friendly relations
or confidence in another's honesty and integrity. There must be some-
thing which approximates a business agency, a professional relation-
""
8The court in Selle v. Wrigley, 233 Mo. App. 43, 116 S.W.2d 217, 221 (1938)
states this propostion as follows: "A confidential relationship may be said to exist
where two persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, confidence is
necessarily reposed by one and the influence which naturally grows out of that con-
fidence is possessed by the other." And in Columbus Co. v. Hurford, 1 Neb. 146,
164 (1871), the court speaks of situations "in which confidence is rightfully re-
posed on one side and a resulting superiority and opportunity for influence is thereby
created on the other." (emphasis supplied in both quotations.)
11 Studybaker v.Cofield, 159 Mo. 596, 61 S.W 246 (1901)
=Id. at 612, 613, 61 S.W at 250.
1 Ibid.
tm Sellev. Wrigley, 233 Mo. App. 43, 116 S.W.2d 217 (1938)
1 Stieber v. Vanderlip, 136 Neb. 862, 287 N.W 773 (1939).
(December
FRAUD AND NONDISCLOSURE
ship, or a family te, something which itself impels or induces the trusting
party to relax the care and vigilance which he otherwise should, or ordi-
narily would, exercise."'122
In the light of these generalizations let us examine some of the cases.
It should be borne in mind that we are concerned primarily with the re-
lationship of vendor and purchaser. But two persons who are in that
relationship may simultaneously occupy one or more other relationships.
Indeed, this fact may be determinative of the existence of a duty and of
the actionability or nonactionability of a failure to disclose material facts.
We have yet to inquire to what extent the relationship of vendor and
purchaser may in itself be considered fiduciary in nature.
A lessor sued his lessee, under an oil lease, for fraud in accounting for
profits. The trial court found that the plaintiff had "implicit faith" in
the honesty and integrity of the defendant, but held that "this was not
sufficient to make out a fidiciary relationship."'123
A patient had voluntarily entered a mental hospital. Subsequently he
expressed a desire to be released, and the hospital failed to inform him
that he could secure a release upon a written order. He sued for false
imprisonment. The court held that the relationship was not such as
would render fraudulent a failure to disclose.' 24 If the general statements
quoted earlier have any significance, the result in this case is unsound.
Surely a patient has a right to rely on a hospital for a full disclosure of all
facts which would be of importance to him, provided that possession of
the facts would not be harmful to him.
A Texas court found no fiduciary relation to exist between the tem-
porary admimstrator of a decedents estate and the collateral heirs of the
decedent.2
5
In another case,'26 the defendant bought and sold bonds for the plain-
tiff for thirty years, the transactions involving, in all, several millions of
dollars. The plaintiff sued for fraud, alleging that the defendant failed
to disclose to him material facts about the state of the markets. Held,
judgment for the defendant. There was no fiduciary relationship between
the parties despite the long history of their transactions and the many
I
mCollins v. Nelson, 193 Wash. 334, 75 P.2d 570 (1938). Another court stated
the proposition in the following terms: "Confidential relation is not confined to any
specific association of the parties. It appears when the circumstances make it
certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an over-
mastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably re-
posed." Leedom v. Palmer, 274 Pa. 22, 117 Ad. 410 (1922).
' Fowler v. Associated Oil Co., 74 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1937).
'"Roberts v. Paine, 124 Conn. 170, 199 Ad. 112 (1938).
'Whitsel v. Hoover, 120 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
' Harrison v. Welsh, 295 Pa. 501, 145 Ad. 507 (1929).
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expressions of confidence and reliance by the plaintiff upon the service
or judgment of the defendant. Although the vendor had a better op-
portunity to acquire knowledge as to the value of the subject matter of
the sale, the facts were discoverable by the purchaser. Hence, there was
no duty of disclosure. This case represents a fairly strict attitude and an
unwillingness to find that trust existed as a fact where the relationship, al-
though intimate and long-lasting, was essentially no more than one of
vendor and purchaser.
There is one class of cases in which there is considerable conflict in
the decisions as to the existence of a fiduciary relationship, viz. those in-
volving promoters, directors or officers of a corporation on the one hand
and shareholders or prospective shareholders on the other. The existence
of this conflict is symptomatic, in this instance, of a transitional stage in
the law, for there can be no doubt that the concept that directors and
other "insiders" stand in some sort of position of trust as to the "out-
siders" is gaining in favor. It has been many times stated that as a gen-
eral rule a director or officer does not occupy a fiduciary relation toward
a shareholder,12 7 although that rule has been undergoing steady attri-
tion.
1 2 8
But even the fairly early cases recognized that special circumstances
may exist which impose a duty to disclose facts regarding corporate af-
fairs affecting the value of the stock. In a Canadian case,12 9 for example,
where the managing officers of a corporation concealed the fact that, as
a committee appointed for the purpose, they had sold corporate property
at a price which greatly enhanced the value of the corporate stock and
bought in the stock at the lower value, the officers were liable to the
seller, since, under the circumstances, the information was received in a
fiduciary capacity.
Many cases state that the directors do not stand in a fiduciary relation
when dealing with shareholders for the purchase or sale of stock (though
they may occupy a fiduciary relation to the corporation) and in order to
constitute fraud in such a case there must be actual misrepresentation.'80
A fortiori, where both of the parties to the purchase and sale of corporate
stock are officers and directors of a corporation, neither owes the other
any special duty of a fiduciary nature, and the sale will not be set aside
because of the purchaser's failure to disclose all the facts within his
'See cases collected in 84 A.L.X 615, 623 et seq. (1933).
mNote, Fiduciary Obligations of Controlling Shareholders, 7 WEST. REs. L REv.
467 (1956).
' Gadseen v. Bennette, 23 Man. L. Rep. 33, 9 D.L.R. 719 (1913).
' Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W 955 (1925). One case states that
if the shareholder actually relies, the director must make full disclosure. George v.
Ford, 36 App. D.C. 315 (1911).
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knowledge bearing on the value of the stock. The result is not changed
by the fact that at the time of the purchase, the stock is worth much more
than the price paid.' 31
If, on the other hand, the shareholder makes inquiries, the officers and
directors, dealing with him for the purchase of his stock must reveal fully
and truthfully the facts concerning the financial condition of the com-
pany, the value of the stock, the probability of dividends, future plans,
etc.132
Lovell v. Smoth'3 3 is a fairly extreme but not entirely typical example
of the cases which imapose no duty of disclosure. The defendants, pro-
moters of a corporation, did not disclose in their prospectus the fact that
they had secured their stock on more advantageous terms than those on
which it was being offered to the public, and the plaintiff. Nor did they
disclose that they had procured, at the outset, voting control over the com-
pany. The trial court found no statements in the prospectus which were
fraudulent or calculated to deceive the plaintiff. The court found no
fraud, no fiduciary relation and no duty to disclose. Judgment for the
defendants was affirmed. There are, on the other hand, cases, especially
recent cases, which hold that directors and officers occupy a fiduciary re-
lationship to the shareholders, imposing a duty to disclose all material
facts and declaring that silence amounts to fraud. 34
An extreme representative of these cases is Hotchkzss v. Fischer'35
where, it was held that a director who purchases on his own account a
shareholder's shares acts in a relation of "scrupulous trust and confidence,"
is required to deal with the utmost fairness and to communicate fully to
the shareholder all material facts bearing on the transaction, which he
knows or which, because of his position, he should know. A shareholder
was permitted to recover damages for the director's failure to make full
disclosure even though the defendant furnished the plaintiff with a state-
ment which fully explained and fairly showed the true financial condi-
tion of the company and, in addition, answered truthfully such questions
as the plaintiff asked and offered to give any further requested informa-
tion within his knowledge. The nondisclosure lay in the fact that the
financial statement did not, without interpretation, disclose the real finan-
cial condition of the company.
Other casesi36 take a similar, if less extreme, point of view, and one
Hm allidie v. First Federal Trust Co., 177 Cal. 600, 171 Pac. 431 (1918)
'
mWaller v. Hodge, 214 Ky. 705, 283 S.W 1047 (1926).
3 232 Ala. 626, 169 So. 280 (1936).
' Carr Consol. Biscuit Co. v. Moore, 125 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
S136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
See, e.g. Markey v. Hibernia Homestead Ass'n, 186 So. 757 (La. App. 1939).
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of them sums the matter up by stating that there is at least a "quasi-fi-
duciary connection" between a stockholder and the officers or directors
of a corporation. The modern trend is in favor of this viewpoint
Many other relatAons have been held to be fiduciary in character un-
der the facts of a particular case.
The director of a children's camp, for example, was recently held liable
in fraud to the parents of a camper for his failure to fully disclose the
facts concerning the dispensary and infirmary facilities. The court stated
that the defendant occupied "a position similar to one in a fiduciary rela-
tion wherein nondisclosure is recognized as the basis for fraud." 7
A general contractor was held liable for not disclosing his failure to
use the type of roofing materials stipulated for.1 38 The executor of a de-
cedent's estate was held to owe the remainderman the highest degree of
fidelity and, in obtaining the latter's signature to a deed conveying his
interest to the executor, the executor had a duty, to disclose, fully and
fairly, all pertinent facts. His failure to do so amounted to fraud as a
matter of law (good faith was immaterial) and entitled the remainder-
man to a cancellation of the deed. 3 9
In an interesting Missouri case,' 40 the purchaser of a deed of trust
sued to recover damages for misrepresentation from the defendant real
estate company. The plaintiff was allowed to recover although there were
no affirmative representations as to the existence of tax liens against the
property. The court found a fiduciary relation to exist and held, accord-
mgly, that the defendant owed to the plaintiff, its client, "something more
than mere silence on the important question of the condition of the prop-
ery with respect to taxes thereon. ",141 The court stressed the fact that
that the company was experienced in such business, that its officers knew
Here the plaintiff sued for fraud, alleging that the defendant association induced her
to sell her shares of defendant's capital stock to it at a discount. The association failed
to advise the shareholder that it intended to renew its rejected application to the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation for insurance on its stock. This, felt
the court, warranted an inference of intentional concealment and bad faith. Judg-
ment for the defendant on demurrer was reversed. See also Heckscher v. Edenborn,
203 N.Y. 210, 96 N.E. 441 (1911) in which the defendant promoter of a syndicate
was held to be under a duty to give information of his interest. Failure to do so was
held to be fraud, entitling the other parties to rescind the syndicate agreement. The
court stressed the "rather intimate and influential relations" which existed.
' Schlenoff v. Kroll, 207 Misc. 1082, 141 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1955). Plaintiff, how-
ever, could not recover in fraud because he had elected to rescind.
' Ruebeck v. Hunt, 171 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), aff'd, 142 Tex. 167,
176 S.W.2d 738 (1943) Fraud was relied on because of the statute of limitations.
't~ Murphy v. Cartwright, 202 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1953). The executor failed to dis-
close the value or extent of the estate.
"°Klika v. Wenzlick Real Estate Co., 150 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. App. 1941).
1
, Id. at 23.
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that the plaintiff was not experienced and that in her lack of experience,
plaintiff "had a right to repose complete confidence' in the agent of the
defendant, and was justified in expecting full disclosure.
Chandler v. Butler 4i ' was an action by a seller of stock for damages
allegedly suffered as a result of fraudulent representations as to the value
of the stock by the purchaser. There were no actual, verbal representa-
tions. In finding a relation of trust and in holding for the plaintiff, the
court emphasized the seller's advanced age, his lack of knowledge as to
the fair market value of his stock, the purchaser's knowledge of this igno-
rance and of the fact that -the plaintiff was trusting the purchaser to deal
fairly. They were not, said the court, dealing at arm's length, and the
defendant therefore had a duty to speak and no right to evade, conceal,
.- ipress, mislead or overreach the seller.
Other examples of a fiduciary relation "in fact," are presented in the
S.14 3
ofany of the cases just discussed involved vendors and purchasers. We
turn now to our final inquiry- Is the vendor-purchaser relationship (in
the absence of any other special relations) inherently fiduciary, either in
law or in fact?
Clearly, the vendor-purchaser relation is not within that class of rela-
tions which the law has traditionally regarded as fiduciary in character.
This point is borne out by the many cases discussed and cited in the sec-
tions dealing with the duties of the vendor and of the purchaser. It is
further emphasized by the following statements:
The relation of the parties was merely that of buyer and seller not af-
fected by any fiduciary obliganons. " (emphasis supplied)
The parties here were dealing at arm's length, the usual situation of
14284 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
'"In Trout v. Harrell, 217 Ark. 670, 676, 233 S.W.2d 233, 236 (1950) the plain-
tiff sought to cancel a deed which she alleged was obtained from her by the fraud of
the defendant, her step-son. The court declared that "the mere relatioaship of step-
mother and step-son does not, ipso facto, create a confidential relationship in all the
dealings between the parties. Likewise, the mere relationship of cotenancy does not,
ipso facto, create a confidential relationship in all the dealings between the parties,
even though such a relationship may exist in some matters." But rescission was al-
lowed because the defendant, in answering the plaintiff's questions, was evasive and
equivocal, and the court felt that plaintiff in fact, did rely on the answers.
In Gardner v. Nash, 225 S.C. 303, 82 SL.2d 123 (1954) the defendant know-
ingly allowed the impression to exist that he was bidding in for the mortgagor at a
foreclosure sale, with the result that the bidding was "chilled." He then refused to
convey to the mortgagor. Held, the failure to speak, under the circumstances,
amounted to the suppression of a fact which should have been disclosed, and con-
stituted a fraud.
'" Noved Realty Co. v. A. A. P. Co., 250 App. Div. 1, 293 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1937).
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vendor and purchaser; neither trusted the other; each sought to gain all the
advantage possibleus
And in a case in which a fiduciary relation was found to exist, the court
took pains to point out that "he [the vendor] did not occupy the position
of an ordinary vendor, but he was inviting others to confer upon him a
fiduciary relationship."' 46 (emphasis supplied) The unplication is dear.
that the "ordinary vendor" does not occupy a fiduciary position.
If the vendor and the purchaser did occupy such a position toward
each other, then each would have a duty of full disclosure and a correspond-
ig right to rely on disclosure by the other. The question whether a fiduci-
ary relation exists could be formulated in different terms: Do they have a
right to rely And this question, once we accept the proposition that there
may exist relations fiduciary-in-fact, distills into a factual question: Do ven-
dors and purchasers en fact rely on each other for full and fair disclosure?
If they do as a matter of practice, then they have a right to do so and a de
facto fiduciary relationship arises.' 47 This conclusion is reached in the fol-
lowing manner: If the parties in fact rely, as a matter of general custom and
practice, then each must be held to know that he is being relied upon. He is
thus placed under a duty to justify that reliance. Ergo, he is in a position
of trust and confidence with which his conduct must comport. He is a
fiduciary.
Those cases which have predicated liability upon nondisclosure have
done so on one of two grounds. Either they have found that in addition to
the vendor-purchaser relation, another relation of trust subsisted between
the parties; or they have found (this is usually implicit in the decision
rather than express) that vendors and purchaser do rely, that each knows
that the other relies, that custom sanctions the reliance and that this results
in the creation of a duty not to frustrate the confidence thus reposed by
failure to disclose material facts.
'Greenberg v. Glickman, 50 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1944), %mmatersally modified, 268
App. Div. 882, 51 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1945), appeal dented, 268 App. Div. 987, 51
N.Y.S.2d 861 (1945).
'8It may be helpful in this regard not to generalize about the vendor-purchaser re-
lation. There would seem to be a distinction between the relationship, on the one
hand, of two experienced business men, consummating a sale and purchase and the
relationship, on the other, of salesman and customer in a large retail store. To the
former, the description "arm's length" seems to be appropriate, and there is little
ground for reliance, except to the extent of warranties and of unequivocal represen-
tations of fact. But in the latter, it may be doubted whether it is ever possible for
the parties to achieve equality of knowledge. And while the customer may be held
to act at his peril in relying on statements which he should recognize to be cus-
tomary "sales talk," it can be argued that he relies, and justifiably so, on the sales
person not to remain silent as to material facts of which he knows the purchaser is
ignorant.
" This would be so unless there were some overmastering social or economic reason
to deny recognition to the de facto relation.
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Most courts evidently believe that in the world of business transactions,
men are "rugged individualists," that even scrupulously honest men who
would not affirmatively suppress or conceal the facts, are willing to exploit
their superior knowledge of the facts by failing to make a gratuitous dis-
closure to the other party.
Let us assume that this is an accurate appraisal of business ethics as they
exist in our society. The next question is whether this -is a desirable state of
affairs. It it is, then the majority of courts are correct in denying a remedy
for "mere silence." But let us assume, arguendo, that it is morally repre-
hensible for a vendor not to disclose .to his purchaser (and, of course, vice
versa) facts, known to the one and not to the other, which if
known to the other, would materially affect his conduct with re-
spect to the transaction. Let us suppose that it could be shown that such
a rule of conduct is morally degrading and that it is, in effect, no different
and no less deplorable than active fraud and deceit, which are clearly be-
yond the pale. These suppositions do not settle the matter. There are many
areas in which human conduct falls short of the standards demanded by a
high sense of morality.1 48 Does the law in each such area use its powers of
restraint and of coercion to enforce adherence to the dictates of morality?
Should it? Can it? This is the heart of the problem: Is it the function of
the law to elevate man morally, to "improve" his social behavior and to
set an ethical norm which is higher than the existing mores and standards
of society? Or should the law content itself with reflecting and enforcing
the moral norms of society as they are?
Much has been written and will be written on this question, for it is a
complex and profound one, and it has a direct bearing not only on the
subject under consideration but on many of the unresolved problems in the
field of torts. After all, the first and central substantive question in tort
law as to any pattern of behavior is always: Is this a wrong? Although the
question may be asked in varying forms: Was the defendant under a
duty ' Did the plaintiff have a right? - the essence of the question
does does not change. And the answer invariably depends on the broader
question of whether the law is to be an active and creative force in shaping
man's social behavior or a passive reflector and applier of the accepted
standards. This is the underlying question in the field of fraudulent non-
disclosure as much as in any other tort problem. And it is no less so merely
because the courts tend to ignore it. Most judges are not social philosophers.
1 One scholar, at least, believes that "people must satisfy their ethical feelings by
laying down a moral rule, while they actually live on a lower grade of morality."
Page, Professor Ehrlich's Czarnouitz Seminar of Lnvng Law, HANDBOOK OF THE
ASS'N. OF A m LAw ScHooLs 46 (1914), as quoted in 22 B.U.L. REV. 607, 609
(1942).
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Yet indirectly their decisions on the so-called "questions of law" imply an
answer to the broader questions of legal philosophy. And, whether expressly
or not, decision in those areas of law which, like the one under considera-
tion, are really permeated with moral questions, reflect the moral judgment
of the court. If a failure to disclose is, under the particular facts, shocking
enough to the moral sense, relief will be granted. If it falls short of this
effect, the courts will say that whatever the status of the defendant's conduct
in the "forum of the conscience" it is not actionable in the forum of the
law.
Many cases demonstrate that the courts are concerned with honesty
and morality. One speaks of "honesty and good faith" as that which re-
quires disclosure.149  Another speaks of "common honesty and fair deal-
ing."'150 And, when, as often happens, the ultimate task of deciding whether
there was a fraud, is assigned to the jury, the members of that body (except
to the extent that they are effectively limited by the court's instructions)
will surely apply their own moral standards in deciding whether the de-
fendant's conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to justify giving the plain-
tiff relief.' 51
It has been said that there has been a shift in business ethics from a
period in which reliance was hardly ever justified and when one could as-
sume that the other party would overreach, to one in which there prevails a
new and higher standard. 152 Others have said that the doctrine of caveat
emptor has lost much of its content.153 Without evaluating the accuracy of
these observations, one may safely conclude that they possess some basis,
and that both judge and jury, try as they might to objectify their attitudes,
are sensitive at least to the grosser changes in business ethics. The question
here is how high an ethical standard will be demanded. Or, stated differently,
how much of a premium will be placed on shrewdness and astute bargaining
skill, either of the vendor or the purchaser, which falls short of active con-
cealment or clear misrepresentation? Like many other legal questions, it
is fundamentally an ethical and social question. The answer is still being
formulated, and since the law, though gradual, is not static, the process of
formulation will be endless.
'" Lovell v. Smith, 232 Ala. 626, 169 So. 280 (1936).
'
m Weiland v. Turkelson, 38 N.J. Super. 239, 118 A.2d 689 (1955).
'At least one writer believes that the question whether the particular nondisclosure
is actionable is one properly in the province of the court. Yet the same writer de-
clares that the standard of fair conduct is that of the "ordinary ethical person." This
would seem to require the type of factua determination which, in our jurisprudence,
has traditionally been the prerogative of the jury. Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and
Non-disclosure, 15 Tax. L. R . 1 (1936)
'PROssER, TORTS 552 et seq. (2d ed. 1955).




It is always dangerous, in any area of the law, to make statements which
even approach absolutism. There is hardly a rule which does not have ex-
ceptions and the enunciation of which, if unqualified, would not be mis-
leading. Yet there is an advantage in placing a rule in rather sharp focus,
and in bringing out its essential outlines, unconcerned for the moment, with
the nuances and detail. The attempt to hedge, to be cautious, to include the
circumstances which qualify its application within the formula itself re-
sults, ofen as not, in a fuzzy statement and an unwieldy instrumentality.
Most of the cases and the writers, including the writers of the various
applicable Restatements, seem to be overly afraid of the definite formula-
tion.
Fully aware of the dangers of generalization and of the importance of
knowing the exceptions, this writer is willing to state that in the typical
transaction, nondisclosure of material facts on the part of a vendor or pur-
chaser is not fraudulent. This is the older law, and, notwithstanding a
movement in the other direction, manifested by the gradual multiplication
of qualifying exceptions, it is the modern law as well.
Special circumstances will change the result. If, for example, the facts
are such that another, a classically fiduciary relationship exists, or if there
is an extremely strong reason to justify the reposing of trust and confidence,
and it is, in fact, reposed, the law will impose a duty of disclosure. If the
facts are exclusmely in -the possession of one party and absolutely inaccessi-
ble to the other, the same result may occur.154 If the undisclosed fact is of
the existence of a latent defect in real property, many courts impose lia-
bility for the nondisclosure, especially if the vendor created the condition
or if it is dangerous to health or safety. If, something is said, and what is
left unsaid would qualify it absolutely, the nondisclosure will be actionable.
If questions are asked, and evasive or half-true answers are given, this may
be fraud. If affirmative acts of concealment are indulged in, they will be
deemed equivalent to verbal misrepresentations. 55 If the implication of
silence, in the light of surrounding circumstances, is to falsely represent the
existence or nonexistence of a fact, the silence will be deemed wrongful.
If conditions have changed since an affirmative representation, true when
made, was made, the maker may be under a duty to speak. And finally, if
the conscience of the court, which is at least to a substantial degree, the
'See dictum in Everett v. Gilliland, 47 N.M. 269, 141 P.2d 326 (1943) The
courts speak in terms of reasonable inaccessibility but seem to act in terms of absolute
inaccessibility.
'Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranch Co., 128 U.S. 383 (1888)
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archetype of the conscience of the community, is sufficiently stirred, relief
will be given.
In our culture, to date, passive concealment is generally not considered
immoral or -fraudulent. Accordingly, for the cautious vendor or the diligent
purchaser who has a monopoly of the material facts, silence is truly golden.
And only if rather special circumstances are found to exist will the law
enact its penalty and hold that silence was fool's gold.
